Can better governance increase university efficiency? by Duch Brown, Néstor & Vilalta-Bufí, Montserrat
 CAN BETTER GOVERNANCE INCREASE UNIVERSITY EFFICIENCY?   
Néstor Duch-Brown, Montserrat Vilalta  
Document de treball de l’IEB 2010/52 
 
 
 
Documents de Treball de l’IEB 2010/52 
CAN BETTER GOVERNANCE INCREASE UNIVERSITY EFFICIENCY? 
 
Néstor Duch-Brown, Montserrat Vilalta  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Barcelona Institute of Economics (IEB) is a research centre at the University of 
Barcelona which specializes in the field of applied economics. Through the IEB-
Foundation, several private institutions (Caixa Catalunya, Abertis, La Caixa, Gas Natural 
and Applus) support several research programs. 
 
 
Postal Address: 
Institut d’Economia de Barcelona 
Facultat d’Economia i Empresa 
Universitat de Barcelona 
C/ Tinent Coronel Valenzuela, 1-11 
(08034) Barcelona, Spain 
Tel.: + 34 93 403 46 46 
Fax: + 34 93 403 98 32 
ieb@ub.edu 
http://www.ieb.ub.edu 
 
 
The IEB working papers represent ongoing research that is circulated to encourage 
discussion and has not undergone a peer review process. Any opinions expressed here are 
those of the author(s) and not those of IEB. 
 
 
 
Documents de Treball de l’IEB 2010/52 
CAN BETTER GOVERNANCE INCREASE UNIVERSITY EFFICIENCY?  
 
 
Néstor Duch-Brown, Montserrat Vilalta  
 
 
 
ABSTRACT:  This paper links governance reforms with potential improvements in efficiency 
in Spanish universities. Taking the classic DEA model as our starting-point, we focus on the 
study of efficient units to identify the ones that present atypical behaviour (outliers) and should 
be removed from the analysis, and then to order the remaining institutions in terms of what is 
known as robust efficiency. Moreover, we use a second stage regression analysis and a three-
stage adjusted values non-parametric model to analyse the influence of environmental factors 
on the efficiency scores obtained. Once environmental factors are taken into account, the 
remaining unexplained inefficiency is attributed to governance failures. Our results indicate 
that the observed inefficiency in Spanish public universities is mainly determined by deficient 
governance. Thus, there is scope for improvements in efficiency through governance reform. 
 
 
 
JEL Codes:  C14, I23, L31 
Keywords:  Efficiency, governance, universities. 
 
 
Néstor Duch-Brown 
University of Barcelona & 
IEB  
Faculty of Economics and Business 
Dpt. of Public Finance 
Avda. Diagonal, 690, T4, 2ª 
08034 Barcelona, Spain 
E-mail: nduch@ub.edu 
 
Montserrat Vilalta 
Escola Universitària del Maresme - UPF 
General and Applied Economics Unit  
Av. Ernest Lluch, s/n 
08302 Mataró, Spain 
E-mail: mvilalta@tecnocampus.cat 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
In many countries, the organization of higher education has changed dramatically in recent 
years (de Boer et al, 2007). Although departing from very different situations, the 
governance structures adopted converge towards more market-based organizational 
systems. Even if there is little empirical evidence of the relationship, it is hypothesized that 
these new governance structures can increase levels of efficiency. In Europe, for example, 
higher education systems have undergone profound changes in the last decades, particularly 
since the late 1990s. With the Bologna Process, launched in 1999 and the Lisbon Agenda of 
2000, higher education in Europe has seen the introduction of more market-type 
mechanisms and modern types of governance. In these reforms, public control is gradually 
being replaced by self-management and autonomy in the name of efficiency. Through 
competition and greater institutional autonomy, Higher Education Institutions (HEIs 
hereafter) are being asked to raise their capacity and engagement in the production and 
transfer of knowledge in order to satisfy their varied consumers’ demands. 
 
In Spain, the number of higher education students has increased three-fold over the past 
three decades, reaching one of the highest rates of university education in Europe. In this 
period, the number of HEIs has evolved in parallel, with the establishment of universities in 
all cities and major towns. This process has been accompanied by political and 
administrative decentralisation1 within the framework of university reforms. The first 
impulse was the University Reform Act (LRU) which came into force in 1983, and focused 
on universities’ organization and scientific modernization. The second was the Universities 
Act (LOU) introduced in 2001, with the aims of implementing quality assurance policies 
and preparing for the Spanish university system’s entry into the European Higher Education 
Area (EHEA). Other measures envisaged in this law, such as regulations governing the 
functioning of universities, have been at the centre of the debate on education. The 
modification of the LOU in 2007 introduced changes related to rectoral elections, faculty 
accreditation and selection, and the coordinating bodies of university policy. 
                                                 
1 In Spain, higher education comprises universities and vocational schools. In our discussion of HEIs we will 
refer exclusively to universities. 
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 In Spain’s decentralised model, governance over higher education is generally divided up 
between the state, the autonomous regions, local governments and educational institutions. 
The central government keeps control over the legal framework that guarantees the 
homogeneity and unity of the education system. The Ministry of Education and Science 
(MEC) is the central government department entrusted with exercising this legal control, 
whereas the autonomous regions are responsible for administering the HEIs within its 
territory. The government of each autonomous region has the jurisdiction to set up, 
authorise and oversee the running of public and private institutions, academic and 
administrative staff, and to build new educational facilities and renovate existing ones. The 
University Coordination Council (CCU) is the system’s coordinating body. It comprises all 
the university rectors, representatives of regional governments, and experts appointed by 
the central government and by parliament2. 
 
Higher education regulations grant autonomy to universities. Although the legal framework 
establishes the general rules for the organisation of public universities, the different 
institutions are free to define their own structure and organise their educational 
programmes. The autonomy granted to universities allows them to: i) draw up their own 
statutes; ii) choose, designate and change their governing and representative bodies; iii) 
draw up plans for courses, research and specific areas of study3; iv) issue official degrees 
that are valid throughout Spain, as well as university-specific certificates and degrees. 
Universities may introduce new official courses, provided that they have received 
authorisation from the autonomous region and the courses appear in the official catalogue 
of government-approved degrees. The current legal framework grants public universities 
the freedom to draw up their own budgets. Similarly, each university is free to decide how 
many teaching, administrative and service posts it offers (both civil service and non-civil 
                                                 
2 In addition, the central government and the autonomous regions can delegate powers to city councils in 
areas that are directly related to their interests. Councils do not have a common body to oversee these 
functions, although most do have an education department and some have set up municipal education 
institutes. Their functions range from providing information on the city‘s educational institutions and 
fostering community involvement in education (through the municipal education council) to the management 
and upkeep of non-university institutions. 
3 Study plans are fixed to a great extent by the Ministry, following the tradition of the national diploma. 
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service). Civil servants are awarded posts in accordance with the civil service legislation of 
the central government and the autonomous regions4. 
 
Reforms in the Spanish higher education sector have been less frequent and less profound 
than in other European countries, especially those referring to universities’ external and 
internal governance mechanisms. The creation of the EHEA and the objectives of the 
Lisbon Agenda are calling for additional and deeper reforms. To be able to face these 
challenges, Spanish HEIs have to become more flexible, and they must do so by 
implementing modern governance structures. But can these governance reforms enhance 
HEIs’ efficiency? If the answer to this question is affirmative, then governance reforms are 
to be welcomed. Otherwise, reforms should be oriented towards more effective goals. 
Although there is a growing literature analysing the effects of better governance 
mechanisms on private firms’ efficiency, there is less evidence on public or non-profit 
institutions. Even though market-based reforms have been increasingly adopted by 
European policy makers, there is little empirical evidence that these new governance 
systems indeed result in efficiency gains. In this paper we aim to contribute to this 
literature. 
 
In this paper we investigate to what extent governance can explain HEI inefficiency with 
data from Spanish public universities. We compute outlier-free efficiency scores using the 
superefficiency DEA procedure. In order to explain the inefficiency observed, in the second 
stage of the study we control for several environmental factors, separating the inefficiency 
attributable to non-controllable inputs (NCIs hereafter) from that attributable to 
governance. As a robustness check, we use two alternative methods, a second-stage 
regression analysis and a three-stage adjusted values non-parametric model. The paper 
proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the methodological strategy. Section 3 describes the 
data and the specification of inputs and outputs as well as the environmental factors 
considered. Section 4 presents the results and discusses our main findings. The last section 
concludes. 
                                                 
4 The categories and salaries of the academic staff, however, are established by central government and 
regional laws. 
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2. Dealing with efficiency measurement 
 
The DEA technique has been widely used in the technical efficiency analysis of production 
units, and it is especially useful as a tool to study performance in the public sector. Even 
though it has not frequently been used in the case of Spanish universities, there is abundant 
evidence for other countries. However, given the differences between the diverse higher 
education systems, the results cannot be compared and are difficult to extrapolate. 
 
DEA models have a long tradition in the analysis of university efficiency evaluation, 
although the objectives of these studies differ. In its origins, DEA applied to higher 
education was used exclusively to analyse either departmental efficiency [Ahn, Arnold, 
Charnes and Cooper (1989), Beasley (1995), Johnes and Johnes (1995), Chen, (1997), 
Siegel, Waldman, and Link (1999) to mention only a few] or institutional efficiency [Ahn, 
Charnes and Cooper (1988), Goudriaan and de Groot (1993), Jongbloed and Vink (1994), 
Coelli (1996), Athanassopoulos and Shale (1997), McMillan and Datta (1998), and Avkiran 
(2001) among others]. More recently, the analysis of HEI efficiency is used to investigate 
different topics such as productivity and technological change [Worthington and Lee 
(2008), Ng and Li (2009)], congestion [Flegg and Allen (2007)], competition [Abbott and 
Doucouliagos (2009)], the establishment of minimum educational standards [Ruggiero 
(2007)] and comparisons of stochastic against non-stochastic methods [McMillan and Chan 
(2006)]. 
 
Martinez (2000) and Gimenez and Martinez (2006) applied DEA models to departments 
within Spanish universities. Duch (2006) and Johnes and Salas-Velasco (2007) are 
examples of studies analysing Spanish HEIs in general. Some specific applications use 
DEA to study, for instance, human resources policy at the University of Malaga [Caballero 
et al. (2004)] or the effects of the decentralisation of competencies in the LRU on the 
efficiency of regional higher education systems [Parellada and Duch (2006)]. In this paper 
we follow this last strand and use a DEA model to study the relationship between 
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governance and efficiency. In so doing we want to assess whether a reform in the internal 
and external governance mechanisms of Spanish universities could improve their efficiency 
levels. 
 
2.1 Basic features of Data Envelopment Analysis 
 
Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978) developed the DEA methodology outlining a 
mathematical problem whose resolution requires linear programming techniques. The 
authors’ idea was to build an enveloping surface or efficient frontier from the available data 
for a set of decision-making units (DMUs hereafter); those that determine the frontier are 
called efficient. The starting point is to define efficiency mathematically as the quotient of 
the weighted sum of all outputs over the weighted sum of all inputs. This problem is 
defined as: 
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where n units (j=1,2,…,n) are considered, each one using different quantities of the same 
inputs (x1,x2…, ,xm) to produce the same outputs (y1,y2…, ,ys). In this setting, xij represents 
the quantity of input i consumed by the DMU j; yrj the quantity of output r produced by the 
unit j; xi0 represents the quantity of input i consumed by the DMU under evaluation; and yro 
the quantity of output produced by this last DMU. The coefficients ur (r = 1,2,…,s) and vi 
(i=1,2,…,m) represent the weights or input and output multipliers, respectively. In order to 
obtain the corresponding efficiency scores, it is necessary to solve this mathematical 
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optimization problem for each one of the DMUs considered. The dual equivalent of this 
problem is known as the enveloping form and is the most used version in DEA 
applications: 
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If the solution for the enveloping form is 1*0 =h , then the unit that is being evaluated is 
efficient in relation to the other units according to the definition of Farrell (1957), given 
that it is not possible to find another unit or a linear combination of units that obtains at 
least the same output using less inputs. In contrast, if 1*0 <h  the DMU is inefficient and the 
difference )1( *0h−  will indicate the maximum proportional reduction that the unit can 
achieve in all its inputs keeping the same level of output (in input oriented DEA) or the 
maximum proportional increment of outputs that the DMU can achieve with the same level 
of inputs (if the DEA is output oriented). 
 
The DEA model just described assumes that the technology satisfies the property of 
constant returns to scale. This means that when varying the quantity of inputs to some 
proportion, the quantity of output varies to the same proportion. In this case the efficiency 
obtained is termed Global Technical Efficiency (GTE). Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984) 
modified this condition to consider variable returns to scale. Mathematically, this is 
obtained by imposing a convexity restriction in the formulation of problem (2) given by 
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jλ . The efficiency measure obtained in this case is named Pure Technical Efficiency 
(PTE) and measures technical efficiency net of scale effects. 
 
If a unit is inefficient, from the computed *jλ s it is possible to obtain a combination of units 
that works better than the DMU under evaluation. This is another advantage of the dual 
form, since it provides additional information on the inefficient units. For each inefficient 
DMU it indicates its reference units or peers. For each inefficient unit, its peers will be 
those DMUs which, in the solution to problem 2, satisfy the condition 0* >jλ  (j=1,2,…,n). 
Through an appropriate linear combination of these peers, an efficient (real or fictitious) 
unit can be obtained whose performance serves as a benchmark for the inefficient unit since 
it will use, as a maximum, the same proportion of inputs of the unit evaluated as inefficient 
and will produce at least the same quantity of outputs. 
 
The simplest way to rank efficient units, without requiring additional computations, is to 
count the number of times an efficient unit serves as a peer for inefficient ones, as 
suggested by Torgersen et al. (1996). The argument states that the more an efficient unit 
appears as a peer of inefficient DMUs, the higher its efficiency level since it constitutes 
more frequently a reference for improvement. However, this procedure does not enable us 
to detect outliers. 
 
2.2 Robust efficiency and outliers 
 
The classic DEA methodology does not discriminate between efficient units. This implies 
that it is not possible to rank all the DMUs based on their computed scores. More 
importantly, this also implies that it is not possible to detect outliers. In this case, efficiency 
scores may be determined by exceptional or atypical observations meaning that inputs 
and/or outputs for these units are not homogeneous with respect to those of other DMUs. If 
one DMU acts as an outlier, it should be removed from the computation of efficiency 
scores in order to obtain unbiased scores. 
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One feature of the DEA method is that it includes the unit under evaluation in the set of 
restrictions. Thus, each unit can be compared with itself and if there are no units with a 
higher efficiency score, its index will always be equal to 1. This is also a concern in the 
case of outliers. This problem worsens with the number of variables considered, since in 
this case the comparison between units becomes more complex and the result of the self-
comparison prevails. 
 
Andersen and Petersen (1993) developed a more sophisticated system to rank efficient units 
giving a definition of robust efficiency (or superefficiency) and suggesting a technique that 
simultaneously evaluates it and detects outliers. Wilson (1993) proposed a very easy-to-
implement criterion to rank efficient DMUs. Later on, Bogetoft (1995), Dula and Hickman 
(1997), Seiford and Zhu (1999) and Bogetoft and Hougaard (2002) refined the 
methodology trying to overcome some of the limitations of the original proposal. 
 
What Andersen and Petersen (1993) proposed was a modification of the structure of the 
conventional mathematical DEA model excluding the unit under evaluation from the set of 
restrictions. The most immediate consequence of this exclusion is that the new efficiency 
score of each unit, '0h , is no longer bounded by one. Besides, with this modification the 
inefficient units will obtain the same score as with the conventional approach, since in their 
evaluation process the reference frontier to which they are compared is not modified. 
 
2.3 The influence of NCIs on efficiency 
 
One of the main drawbacks of the DEA methodology for evaluating efficiency is that it 
does not take into consideration a priori the possible effects on the results of environmental 
factors (variables that cannot be controlled by the DMU managers). In some cases, these 
factors can have a decisive influence in performance. In the literature on primary and 
secondary education, the influence of external factors beyond the control of schools’ 
managers has been amply demonstrated. In a seminal contribution, Coleman et al. (1966) 
pioneered the analysis of the influence of NCIs in education. One of the main results of that 
report is the robust empiric evidence of the decisive role played by families, social 
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environment and individual characteristics of the students (aptitude, attitude, motivation 
and personality among others) in the schools’ efficiency. It is shown that these two factors 
– socioeconomic status and the students’ individual training – often have more influence on 
a school’s efficiency than the quantity of resources available to managers in their efforts to 
achieve it. However, in higher education the possible influence of environmental variables 
on efficiency has only rarely been considered, generally due to lack of appropriate data. In 
this paper we propose some NCIs that may be relevant in the higher education context and 
analyse their influence on universities’ efficiency. 
 
The techniques developed so far to evaluate the influence of NCIs can be divided in two 
broad groups. The first refers to one-stage models where normally the NCIs are included in 
the original DEA specification as additional inputs and so the computed efficiency scores 
already take them into account. The second approach groups several multistage 
methodologies, the first stage always being the computation of efficiency scores with the 
traditional DEA model, and the second (or subsequent) stage(s) incorporating the effects of 
NCIs. 
 
2.3.1 A second stage regression analysis to capture the effects of NCIs 
 
The second stage regression analysis is a technique developed by Ray (1988) that has been 
widely used when evaluating the influence of the NCI on efficiency scores. Some recent 
contributions are those of Chilingerian and Sherman (2004), Ray (2004), Ruggiero (2004) 
and Simar and Wilson (2007). The basic idea of the regression technique in the second 
stage is to consider that the production function of the evaluated DMUs depends on 
controllable and non-controllable inputs. It is assumed that this function adopts a 
multiplicative form: 
 
)()(),()( kikir zhxgzxFyT ⋅==  
 
where (y1,y2,..., ys) is the output vector, (x1,x2,... xm) the controllable inputs vector and 
(z1,z2,..., zt) the vector of non-controllable inputs. The function g(·) can be determined from 
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standard functional forms (e.g. Cobb-Douglas), and it is supposed to be linear so that it 
admits variable returns to scale. The function h(·) takes values between 0 and 1 and 
measures the efficiency of the jth DMU: 
 
tknjzhh kjj ,...,2,1,...,2,1)( ===  
 
This value is in fact the value of the efficiency score obtained with the DEA analysis. The 
function )( kzh  defines the maximum level of attainable efficiency given a certain 
configuration of NCIs. But if inefficiency is due to internal unobserved factors rather than 
environmental ones, such as bad governance, the efficiency level achieved by the evaluated 
unit will be even lower to the one that would be obtained when considering NCIs only. To 
take this possibility into account, it is necessary to introduce a correction factor that 
measures the inefficiency caused by organizational factors different from traditional inputs 
and outputs. Thus, it is convenient to define the function h(·) as follows: 
 
0),( ≤+= jjkjkj zhh εεβ  
 
where kβ  are the parameters of an assumed linear relation and jε  represents pure 
inefficiency due to deficient governance. Without this inefficiency, jh  achieves the highest 
value given by )( jkzh . Obviously, )( kjj zhh ≤ . If )( kjj zhh =  one can conclude that there 
no inefficiency is attributable to governance, and that it is explained by the NCIs 
exclusively. Moreover, if 1<jh , it is possible to calculate the deviation in efficiency due to 
external factors outside the control of the DMU under evaluation. 
 
To determine the function )( kzh  a linear regression is used. Here, the efficiency scores are 
the dependent variable and the NCIs the explanatory variables. Given that the dependent 
variable is censored, a Tobit estimation is required. Once the parameters ( kβ ) are obtained, 
one can compute the estimated value jh  for the jth university. The difference between this 
value and the one obtained with the DEA model informs us of the proportion of 
11
inefficiency attributable to governance. However, the inequality )( kjj zhh ≤  is not always 
satisfied given that the estimated residuals are not always negative. 
 
To solve this problem, Greene (1980) suggests correcting the regression constants so that 
all the residuals are negative and the parameters remain consistent. This correction is made 
by adding to all the jh ’s the value of the biggest residual obtained in the regression. 
Proceeding in this way, one obtains a new adjusted value jh  that will be higher than jh  
except for those DMUs where the biggest residual was obtained, and in so doing estimators 
remain consistent. Finally, one can assign the efficiency non attributable to NCIs to the 
value ( jj hh − ). If 1>jh , then the difference )1( jh−  should be considered. It is likely that 
1>jh  in the case of the most efficient units, and so this procedure will probably 
underestimate their inefficiency levels.  
 
2.3.2 A three-stage adjusted values model to consider the effects of NCIs on efficiency 
 
As an alternative to parametric methodologies, Fried and Lowell (1994) proposed the use of 
a three-stage DEA model for considering NCIs in efficiency evaluation. An advantage of 
this technique is that it uses non-parametric methods in the whole process, reducing the bias 
problem of regression analysis due to the existence of statistical disturbances. The idea of 
these authors is to build a new efficiency score jh  free from the effects of the NCIs. This 
means that this new score defines the maximum level of efficiency attainable by the jth unit 
given a configuration of the NCIs. As in the previous methodology, the part of inefficiency 
attributable to deficient governance is given by the difference )( jj hh − , where jh  is the 
efficiency score of the jth university obtained by applying the original DEA model. This 
approach seeks to find the values of jh  by repeatedly applying the DEA technique. The 
basic idea of the mathematical problem is that the environmental variables are the result of 
the existence of slacks and that these can be considered as inputs in the transformation 
process. 
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The computation strategy is as follows. Once the DEA has been applied and the efficiency 
scores jh  for each evaluated unit obtained, an input-oriented DEA is performed again 
introducing the slacks as inputs and the NCIs as outputs. The intuition behind this first 
stage is to determine to what extent the slacks can be minimized taking the values of the 
NCIs as given. Applying this procedure, for each DMU we will obtain a new score that will 
be termed 0d . At this stage a new frontier formed by the units that are relatively efficient is 
obtained. For these DMUs, the total slacks detected are due to the effect of the NCIs. For 
the units that are not in the frontier, the effect of the NCIs is given by its projection to the 
frontier. 
 
In the second stage, the effect of the NCIs is discounted on each evaluated unit. If the unit 
is in the frontier in the original DEA model, it will be necessary to subtract the value of the 
corresponding total slack from each input and add it to each output. For the other units, it 
will be necessary to correct each one of their inputs and/or outputs with the value of the 
minimum slack obtained in the previous DEA. If for a DMU the value obtained in the first 
stage is 0d , then [ ]*00 )1( ii sxhd +⋅−  is the part of the slack of input i that could be 
explained by the influence of NCIs and [ ]*00 )1()1( ii sxhd +⋅−−  would be the contribution 
of governance failures. The same reasoning applies with respect to outputs. 
 
Once the variables of each DMU are corrected from the possible effects of NCIs, in the 
third stage another DEA is carried out with the corrected input and output values for each 
DMU. The new efficiency scores obtained, jh , define the maximum level of efficiency 
achievable by the jth DMU given its configuration of NCIs. The difference )( jj hh −  will 
indicate the inefficiency attributable to governance. 
 
 
3 Data 
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The data consist of observations of three inputs and four outputs for 46 Spanish public 
universities for the academic year 2004-20055. The main source of information is a report 
published every two years by the Conference of Rectors of Spanish Universities (CRUE, 
2006). The criteria used for selecting inputs and outputs were the following: i) to choose as 
few indicators as possible in order to allow the DEA methodology to better discriminate 
between units; ii) to select inputs reflecting financial, human capital and equipment and 
infrastructures resources, and; iii) to choose outputs for teaching and research trying to 
reflect, in the former case, results linked to both teaching and graduation, and in the latter 
case, both basic and applied research6. 
 
3.1 Specification of inputs and outputs 
 
So far, studies focusing on the efficiency of HEIs have largely neglected the issue of input 
and output quality. This is so because appropriate data to take into account this rather 
imprecise concept are lacking. Nevertheless, in this paper we make an attempt to overcome 
this omission in some way and try to capture input and output quality. Regarding the debate 
on quality in higher education, Barnett (1994) describes it as a conflict of interests among 
different stakeholders. As a consequence, different systems for monitoring different kinds 
of quality, and at different levels, have been developed. One of these is based on the 
elaboration of Performance Evaluation Indicators (PEIs hereafter). This approach to 
evaluating universities compares performance across a range of indicators (Johnes and 
Taylor, 1990). The advantage of using PEIs is to focus on important aspects of the higher 
education system. For instance, some scholars consider PEIs as signals indicating the 
system’s performance (Spee and Bormans, 1992) or as guidelines for quality measurement 
(Cuttance, 1990). As Tam (2001) concludes, PEIs in the university context are helpful to 
analyse the relationship between the inputs they need and the outputs that institutions aim 
to achieve. 
 
                                                 
5 There are 47 public universities in Spain. However, the University of Vigo had to be excluded from the 
analysis due to a lack of appropriate data.. 
6 Lack of data prevented us from considering variables related to the third mission. 
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Our first input indicator is the inverse of the student to faculty ratio. This ratio refers to the 
number of full time equivalent (FTE) faculty in a university with respect to the number of 
FTE students. This ratio is important since the more personal attention students are able to 
receive from their professors, the more they will become engaged in the subject matter and 
the better their performance will be. The lower this ratio, the more attractive a college 
should be in this regard. In order to have a direct relationship between inputs and outputs 
we take the inverse of this indicator, and construct a faculty per 100 students’ ratio. In this 
case, the higher the ratio, the more quality is embedded in an institution’s education. The 
second input indicator concerns administrative resources and is proxied by the inverse of 
the faculty to staff ratio. In this case, we construct this ratio as the quotient of FTE 
administrative staff over FTE faculty. The higher this ratio, the more help faculty receives 
in order to perform bureaucratic tasks and the more productive they can be both in teaching 
and doing research. The last input indicator is non-labour expenditure per student. 
Expenditure in goods and support services that are an integral part of the institution’s 
primary mission of instruction, research, or public service gives an indication of the quality 
and abundance of such services on a per student basis. These include, among others, library 
expenditure, audio/visual services, academic computing support, ancillary support and 
academic administration. 
 
We have chosen two outputs related to teaching activities and two more related to research. 
The first teaching output indicator is the academic return ratio, calculated as the quotient of 
graduates over drop-outs. This captures yearly relative academic return comparing a 
measure of academic success such as the number of students who graduate with one 
measure of failure, given by the number of drop-outs. In this case, values below one 
indicate that there are more drop-outs than graduates thus reflecting an excess of failures 
over successes. One complication with this ratio is that the numbers of graduates and drop-
outs are heavily dependent on the duration of the different degrees; in Spain, in the 
academic year 2004-2005 universities offered degrees ranging from two to six years. In 
order to solve this issue, we compute an overall academic return ratio by institution 
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weighting the variables by the length of each degree7. Our second output for teaching 
activities is the success rate, one of the most frequently used indicators in higher education, 
which relates the number of graduates in a given year over the entry cohort. In our case, 
and given that the length of the different degrees in Spain varies significantly, obtaining a 
consistent indicator turns out to be complicated. We nevertheless compute a proxy 
considering an average length of four years for every degree, and thus the entry cohort for 
any given graduate is that of four years previously. Thus, as our data for graduates 
correspond to the academic year 2004-2005, we use entrants to universities in the academic 
year 2001-2002. 
 
Our first research output indicator is Euros per student from R&D activities. This is a very 
controversial indicator. Some researchers consider it to be more appropriate as an input 
than as an output, arguing that the revenue generated by R&D projects is used normally to 
finance the expansion of infrastructure and equipment for both teaching and research and is 
therefore more a resource than an outcome. Those who consider this indicator as an output 
suggest that this income stream is the most noticeable result of the applied research projects 
promoted by the university, and in our case we consider that this indicator reflects the effort 
and success in applied research and innovation. As shown in table 1, the differences 
observed among Spanish HEIs reveal huge variations and hence a great discriminatory 
power for this indicator. The second output referred to research activities is the number of 
JCR indexed publications per faculty member. This is also a widely-used indicator applying 
a standard that is well established today to reflect the quality and quantity of university 
research. Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics of the inputs and outputs considered. 
 
3.2 Determination of possible NCIs 
 
We assume three possible sources of external factors that can influence universities’ 
efficiency results. Some descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1. 
 
                                                 
7 The weights are as follows: for two-year degrees 0.5, for three-year degrees 0.75, for four-year degrees 1, 
for five-year degrees 1.25, and finally for six-year degrees 1.5. 
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a) Factors that characterize institutions beyond their basic operations 
 
This set of variables should emphasise singular and differentiating features that the 
institution has acquired or configured during its lifetime without being related to present 
conditions. We distinguish three NCIs in this group: 
 
NCI1: Age 
The fact that a university is older than others grants the institution a degree of experience 
that is usually associated with the recognition of a certain prestige8. 
 
NCI2: Degree specialisation 
In the Spanish university system each degree taught is associated with a level of 
experimentation, understood as the number of laboratory practices that the student performs 
during the degree. The overall level of experimentation conditions investments in 
laboratories and specialised classrooms. To capture this characteristic, we build a 
specialisation coefficient defined as the average experimentation level weighted by the 
length of degrees.  
 
NCI3: Size  
Another characteristic that differentiates universities is size, measured by the number of 
students registered in official undergraduate degrees. 
 
b) Factors attributable to the quality of students 
 
NCI4: Average threshold grades of the degrees in the first quartile  
In Spain, each public university establishes its annual threshold entry grade for each degree 
on a decimal scale, defined as the grade of the last student who is able to enter9. In those 
                                                 
8 Since there are some universities that are secular, including the real number of years of existence of these 
institutions could distort the results. Besides, it is considered that the possible effect of this NCI will be the 
same when the years of existence surpass a certain threshold. Thus, we adopted a general value of 50 years to 
indicate that the possible influence of age is the same for all the universities in operation for this period or 
longer. 
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degrees where there is more supply than demand, the threshold grade is by definition 5. 
Since this happens in a large number of degrees, the average threshold grade will not 
discriminate between institutions. For this reason, we consider that a better indicator of 
students’ quality is the average threshold grade for the first quartile of the most requested 
degrees in each university. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 Average Median Est. Dev. Min Max
  
(Student to faculty ratio)-1 7.1 7.0 0.9 5.2 9.1
(Faculty to staff ratio)-1 0.6 0.6 0.1 0.4 0.9
Non-labor expenditure/student (Euros) 973.3 914.2 343.5 470.8 2238.1
Academic return ratio 1.9 1.5 1.6 0.6 10.3
Success rate 0.7 0.7 0.1 0.4 0.9
€/student from R&D activities 150.9 110.8 109.3 35.8 468.2
JCR articles per FTE faculty 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.9
      
NC1: Age 30.1 28.5 14.6 9.0 50.0
NCI2: Degree specialisation 2.6 2.5 0.3 2.0 3.5
NCI3: Size 23,862.7 22,067.0 15,513.7 5,843.0 72,528.0
NCI4: Quality of students 6.5 6.6 0.7 5.0 7.5
NCI5: Regional GDP per capita 15,314.2 15,093.9 3,418.2 9,820.2 20,374.3
NCI6: Scholarship holders 15.8 15.8 4.4 8.0 27.1
Source: Our own data. 
 
c) Factors attributable to the students’ and region’s socioeconomic conditions 
 
Given the impossibility of measuring each student’s socioeconomic and family conditions 
due to lack of appropriate data, we use the following more general socioeconomic 
indicators: 
 
NCI5: Regional GDP 
Given that in most cases more than 80% of a university’s students come from the same 
province, per capital regional GDP will reflect the socioeconomic conditions of these 
students. 
                                                                                                                                                    
9 Only the threshold grades of students coming from high school are considered. The threshold grade for 
every student is computed as the weighted average of their average high school grade (60%) and the grade 
obtained in the university access test (40%). Places are allocated according to the threshold grades of the 
students demanding entry. 
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NCI6: Number of MEC scholarship holders10 
The fact that a student has a scholarship from the MEC mainly indicates a low family 
income. Thus, the more scholarship holders in a university, the greater the share of students 
from low income families and the worse the conditions in which to pursue higher 
education.  
 
 
4. Empirical results 
 
4.1 Efficiency scores and scale efficiency 
 
A summary of the results obtained by applying the output-oriented DEA as explained in 
section two with three inputs and four outputs is shown in table 211. The first column refers 
to the efficiency scores computed under the constant returns to scale (CRS) hypothesis. In 
the second column the efficiency scores under the assumption of variable returns to scale 
(VRS) are shown. Finally, the third column lists the main results of the ratio of constant 
return scores over variable returns scores, the “scale efficiency” that helps to determine 
whether universities are operating at an optimal scale. 
 
Table 2. Summary of results using the classic DEA model 
 CRS VRS Scale 
Efficient units 17 23 18 
Inefficient units 29 23 28 
Average efficiency 0.892 0.917 0.972 
Median efficiency 0.934 1.000 0.986 
Standard deviation 0.131 0.128 0.038 
Lowest efficiency 0.456 0.462 0.845 
Source: Our own data, from results shown in table A1 in the annex. 
 
                                                 
10 These include scholarship holders in universities located in the Basque Country and Navarre, regions with a 
different allocation mechanism than the rest. 
11 Table A1 in the appendix shows the results by university. 
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The number of efficient universities when considering constant returns to scale is 17, with 
an average efficiency of 89.2%. On the other hand, under the assumption of variable returns 
to scale, the number of efficient universities increases to 23, the average efficiency being of 
91.7%. Considering that there is a wide variation in terms of the size of the institutions, it 
seems reasonable to consider the efficiency scores obtained under the hypothesis of 
variable returns to scale as more appropriate. These are the scores that will be used in what 
follows. With these results at hand, it is possible to argue that Spanish universities could 
increase their output by an average of 8.3% with the resources they are already using. 
 
4.2 Inefficient universities: determination of peers 
 
Inefficient units can be ordered according to the computed efficiency scores under the 
assumption of variable returns to scale, as shown in table A2 in the appendix. The first 
university in the list is the most efficient in the set of inefficient units. The remaining 
columns of the table present, for each inefficient unit, the peer(s) (efficient units of 
reference) and the weights in which each of these units is a reference for the inefficient one. 
 
In the standard DEA model all efficient units are assigned a score of 1 and therefore cannot 
be differentiated. One simple way to order efficient units is to count how many times each 
institution appears as a peer for other universities. The ranking of efficient units obtained in 
this way is shown in table 3. 
 
Table 3: Ordering of efficient universities 
University Times as peer University 
Times 
as peer University 
Times 
as peer University 
Times 
as peer 
1: URJC 17 7: UNAVAR 6 13: UPO 2 19: UEX 1 
2: UR 15 8: UGR 5 14: UPC 2 20: UMA 1 
3: UV 14 9: USC 4 15: URV 2 21: UPM 1 
4:UDC 9 10: UPV 3 16: UB 1 22: UAM 0 
5: UZ 8 11: UVA 3 17: UCAN 1 23: ULPGC 0 
6: EHU 7 12: UJAEN 2 18: UCM 1   
Note: Table A3 in the appendix shows the list of Spanish public universities and the acronyms used 
throughout the text. 
Source: Our own data. 
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 4.3 Outliers and robust efficiency 
 
As explained in the methodological section, Andersen and Petersen (1993) modified the 
conventional DEA model to allow for robust efficiency or superefficiency. According to 
the value of the new index obtained with this modification in the restrictions set, a 
classification scheme can be implemented for the efficient units as proposed by Wilson 
(1993): 
 
• If no feasible solution exists or if the computed value is very far from 1 (a 
difference of 25% or higher), it means that the evaluated unit is an outlier. 
 
• For those units that obtain an efficiency score close to 1, the ranking will be 
established by ordering DMUs according to the measure 1001 '0 ⋅− h . 
 
In line with these criteria, table 4 shows the results obtained for the 23 efficient universities 
under the VRS assumption. In our case, a feasible solution has been found for all the linear 
programming problems. Therefore, all outliers are defined as such because the solution 
value found lies well beyond unity (more than 25%). 
 
Table 4: Classification of efficient universities and definition of outliers 
Univ h’0 −1 ' ·1000h   Position Univ h’0 −1 ' ·1000h   Position 
UDC 1.202 20.2%  1 EHU 1.313 31.3% Outlier  
UAM 0.971 2.9%  15 UPC 1.165 16.5%  2 
UB 1.700 70% Outlier  UPM 1.879 87.9% Outlier  
UCAN 0.992 0.8%  16 UPV 1.162 16.2%  3 
UCM 1.002 0.2%  18 UNAVAR 0.914 8.6%  11 
UEX 1.102 10.2%  8 URJC 2.114 111.4% Outlier  
UGR 1.301 30.1% Outlier  URV 1.066 6.6%  13 
UJAEN 0.896 10.4%  7 USC 1.120 12%  6 
UR 1.093 9.3%  9 UV 1.141 14.1%  4 
ULPGC 1.087 8.7%  10 UVA 1.124 12.4%  5 
UMA 1.004 0.4%  17 UZ 0.961 3.9%  14 
UPO 0.931 6.9%  12      
Note: Table A3 in the appendix shows the list of Spanish public universities and the acronyms used 
throughout the text. 
Source: Our own data. 
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We find five outliers among the universities: Barcelona (UB), Granada (UGR), Basque 
country (EHU), Polytechnic of Madrid (UPM) and Rey Juan Carlos (URJC). The 
observation of the input and output values of these universities sheds some light on their 
peculiarities. In general, these are universities where at least one of the variables used 
shows an extreme value, disproportionate with respect to its other variables or with respect 
to the average values. 
 
The Spearman rank correlation coefficient informs us of the level of association between 
the orderings obtained by both approaches. The computed value of 0.5191 with a high 
significance level indicates an intermediate level of correspondence between the ordering 
of universities with and without outliers. In the former case, outliers have been removed 
from the list even if they were considered in order to compute the efficiency scores. 
 
We can now ask what the efficiency scores would be if the outliers were left out of the 
computation. Applying the DEA again under the hypothesis of variable returns to scale 
without considering outlier units, all the universities present greater efficiency indexes, as 
expected. The average inefficiency is now 7.2% compared to the previous 8.3%.  
 
Obviously, universities that were already efficient in the first estimate now remain efficient, 
but with this procedure the number of efficient universities has increased: instead of 18 
there are now 2312. The five universities that now appear as efficient are: Autonomous 
University of Barcelona (UAB), Carlos III of Madrid (UC3M), Miguel Hernández (UMH), 
Oviedo (UNIOVI) and Seville (US). Among these universities, the most distant scores 
between the initial index and the outlier-corrected index correspond to the University 
Carlos III of Madrid and to the University of Seville. So these two institutions are the most 
harmed by the presence of outliers. This result is confirmed by the figures in table 3, where 
the peers of these universities with more weight were in fact outliers. 
 
 
4.4 NCIs and efficiency 
                                                 
12 Once we drop the five outliers, the number of efficient universities falls from 23 to 18. 
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 4.4.1 Second-stage regression analysis 
 
The results derived by running a second-stage Tobit regression are shown in table 5. No 
sign changes are observed when including or excluding strongly correlated explanatory 
variables. Moreover, the levels of global significance (F-test) and the levels of individual 
significance of the coefficients are consistent, that is to say, there are no multicollinearity 
problems.  
 
Table 5. Linear regression results  
  Coefficient Std. Err. t P>t [95% conf. Interval] 
NCI1 -0.0006722 0.003088 -0.22 0.83 -0.007188 0.005844 
NCI2 8.74E-02 0.124286 0.7 4.91E-01 -0.174796 0.349646 
NCI3 -3.34E-06 3.83E-06 -0.87 0.395 -0.000011 4.74E-06 
NCI4 0.1000928 0.052688 1.9 0.075 -0.011070 0.211256 
NCI5 -0.0000121 0.000014 -0.81 0.43 -0.000043 0.000019 
NCI6 -0.0006272 0.010261 -0.06 0.952 -0.022277 0.021022 
Const 0.2450164 0.611646 0.4 0.694 -1.045445 1.535478 
Observations: 23 
Pseudo R2=-0.1833 
Log likelihood = 15.863825 
Source: Our own data. 
 
The effect of NCI4 on the index of global efficiency is highly significant – above 90%. This 
means that the quality of students can explain the inefficiency levels of non-efficient 
universities. Since the sign of the coefficient of this variable is positive, its influence on the 
index of efficiency is also positive. Our results indicate that the other NCIs do not affect the 
efficiency index significantly and, therefore, efficiency can be written exclusively as a 
function of NCI4 as follows: 
 
hj = 0.2450164 + 0.052688·(NCI4) + ej 
 
23
where, as explained, ej is the part of the inefficiency not determined by the influence of the 
NCIs and can be attributable to governance failures. 
 
In accordance with the procedure described in section two, jh  = 0.2450164 + 
0.052688·(NCI4) and the value of ej will be given by the difference )( jj hh − . Applying the 
correction suggested by Greene (1980) to make sure that these differences are positive, the 
new corrected value jh  is obtained. In this case, the biggest positive residual (0.140) 
corresponds to the University of Burgos. Thus, this is the value that must be added to the 
regression constants to obtain the values of jh . To simplify, table 6 presents the values of 
both inefficiencies expressed as percentage of total inefficiency. 
 
The results show that in fifteen universities the whole inefficiency can be attributed to 
governance failures. As expected, the university that presented the biggest positive residual, 
the University of Burgos, is the one that benefited most from the correction suggested by 
Greene, and its inefficiency is fully attributable to the influence of NCI4. Only one other 
university, Huelva, presents a percentage of inefficiency due to the influence of this 
environmental factor that was greater than that attributable to deficient governance. 
 
Table 6. Share of inefficiency attributable to NCIs (regression results) 
University Inefficiency % governance
% 
NCIs University Inefficiency
% 
governance 
% 
NCIs 
UAH 0.247 100 0 UJI 0.538 100 0 
UA 0.245 100 0 ULL 0.225 100 0 
UAL 0.278 78.1 21.9 ULEON 0.064 100 0 
UAB 0.011 100 0 UdL 0.016 100 0 
UBU 0.102 0 100 UMH 0.001 100 0 
UCA 0.120 100 0 UM 0.223 100 0 
UC3M 0.262 91.2 8.8 UNIOVI 0.024 100 0 
UCLM 0.054 100 0 UPCT 0.229 53.3 46.7 
UCO 0.085 81.2 18.8 UPF 0.032 100 0 
UdG 0.124 99.2 0.8 USAL 0.073 100 0 
UHU 0.198 43.4 56.6 US 0.204 100 0 
UIB 0.441 93.4 6.6     
Source: Our own data. 
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4.4.2 Three-stage adjusted values model 
 
As indicated above, the only NCI that was significant when applying the regression 
technique, NCI4, is taken into account. Thus, the number of variables used in the DEA 
application in the second stage will be 1 + 7 = 8 (one output: NCI4, and seven inputs: the 
slacks of each one of the inputs and outputs of the non-efficient universities). All 
universities improve their efficiency scores except the University of Oviedo. To explain 
this, we observe that the values of the slacks of this university, for almost every input and 
output, are very small and much lower than those of the rest of universities13. This may 
mean that the rounding errors are more relevant in this case. In consequence, the 
distribution of the aggregated slack between the part attributable to governance failures and 
that corresponding to the influence of the NCI is not robust. To counteract this situation, we 
assumed that the maximum index attainable by this university given its endowment of NCIs 
is the initial score obtained with the original DEA. Since the value of NCI4 in this 
university is greater than the average, we will consider that this variable exercises a positive 
effect on its efficiency and, because of this, we attribute its whole inefficiency to 
governance failures. 
 
The values of each form of inefficiency expressed in percentage terms of the total are 
presented in table 8. This technique assigns the whole inefficiency to governance in 17 of 
the 23 universities. In four universities, inefficiency due to deficient governance is higher 
than the influence of the environmental factors that we have considered. Only in two 
universities, Castilla-la Mancha and Miguel Hernández, was the inefficiency due to the 
influence of the NCI greater than that of bad governance. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 Non-radial slacks for the University of Oviedo are all equal to zero with the exception of the success rate 
which nonetheless is very low. Given that radial slacks are relatively low as well and inefficiency is only 
2.4%, this university is very close to the efficiency frontier with null projections over the linear segments of 
the frontier (those parallel to the axes). 
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Table 7. Share of inefficiency attributable to NCI 
University Inefficiency % governance
% 
NCIs University Inefficiency
% 
governance 
% 
NCIs
UAH 0.247 100 0 UJI 0.538 100 0 
UA 0.245 100 0 ULL 0.225 100 0 
UAL 0.278 83.3 13.7 ULEON 0.064 100 0 
UAB 0.011 100 0 UdL 0.016 100 0 
UBU 0.102 88.2 11.8 UMH 0.001 0 100 
UCA 0.120 100 0 UM 0.223 99.1 0.9 
UC3M 0.262 100 0 UNIOVI 0.024 100 0 
UCLM 0.054 35.2 64.8 UPCT 0.229 100 0 
UCO 0.085 100 0 UPF 0.032 100 0 
UdG 0.124 100 0 USAL 0.073 100 0 
UHU 0.198 78.3 21.7 US 0.204 100 0 
UIB 0.441 100 0     
Source: Our own data. 
 
Our results clearly indicate that a great deal of Spanish HEIs’ inefficiency is attributable to 
deficient governance. In this regard, there is scope for improvement in performance due to 
better governance mechanisms. Nevertheless, even if the reforms recently implemented all 
over Europe represent an effort to rectify some past “government failures”; modern market-
based reforms are not free from difficulties. While governance measures usually emphasize 
formal structure, bodies and decision-making structures, the governance of HEIs is strongly 
influenced by informal networks, collegial agreements, and more process-oriented 
decision-making structures (Gornitzka, Kogan and Amaral 2005). Since teaching, research, 
and knowledge transfer rely on faculty, an important aim of governance reforms is to focus 
on the institutional conditions that stimulate creativity and productivity. 
 
In the last decade, many Spanish universities have begun implementing strategic 
management and planning systems and have taken steps to improve quality. Many have 
drawn up medium-term and long-term (5-10 year) action plans based on assessments of 
internal operations and determining factors, as well as on the environment in which they 
operate. Many factors have motivated universities to adopt strategic planning measures in 
response to growing concerns about attracting students and funding: for example, the 
increasing social demand for better quality, greater complexity in teaching and research 
management, the need to provide value-added services to the community, and the need to 
extend and improve links with the economic and social environment. 
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 We believe that the introduction of governance reforms in Spanish universities, still a 
matter of debate, will help to increase efficiency in research and teaching. Schubert (2009) 
identifies four potential sources of efficiency gains from market-based governance reforms. 
The first is to increase the operational flexibility of the universities, through faster decision-
making and more problem-oriented processes. The second is to increase accountability by 
strengthening internal hierarchical elements in order to reduce the danger of moral hazard. 
The third source is to provide more information to managers usually by means of the 
introduction of internal accounting models. Finally, the fourth is to improve competencies 
regarding HEI strategic decisions. All these factors are likely to enhance teaching and 
research efficiency as they set out an overall agenda for the departments and the university 
as a whole. 
 
 
5. Conclusions  
 
Using a DEA model this paper has examined the relationship between governance and 
efficiency in Spanish universities in the academic year 2004-2005. The inputs and outputs 
used were defined in terms of the Performance Evaluation Indicators literature in order to 
take into account quality considerations that are often neglected in efficiency studies. The 
inputs included in the analysis were the student to faculty and the faculty to staff ratios as 
well as non-labour expenditure per student. In the case of outputs, we opted for two 
teaching outputs, academic return and success rates, and two research outputs, JCR-indexed 
publications per faculty and Euros per student from R&D activities. Our methodological 
strategy consists in computing outlier-free efficiency scores with the superefficiency 
procedure. In the second stage, when corrected efficiency scores are computed, we control 
for several environmental factors in order to explain the observed inefficiency. We use two 
alternative methods, a second-stage regression analysis and a three-stage adjusted values 
non-parametric model as a robustness check. At this stage we are able to separate the 
inefficiency attributable to non-controllable inputs (NCI) from that corresponding to 
governance. 
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 With the standard DEA model, the number of efficient universities when considering 
constant returns to scale is 17, with an average efficiency of 89.2%. However, under the 
assumption of variable returns to scale, the number of efficient universities increases to 23, 
and average efficiency to 91.7%. With these results at hand, one could argue that 
universities could increase their output by an average of 8.3% with the inputs they are 
already using. In the standard DEA model efficient units cannot be differentiated, but the 
modified DEA model allows for the determination of outlier DMUs and the computation of 
robust efficiency. Our results indicate that there are five outlier universities that should be 
removed from the database in order to compute unbiased efficiency scores. Introducing this 
correction, the average inefficiency is now 7.2%, slightly lower than that obtained with the 
standard DEA model. When controlling for environmental factors, the results from the 
second stage regression analysis show that in 15 out of 23 universities the whole of the 
observed inefficiency can be attributed to governance failures. When using the three-stage 
adjusted values model, in 17 of the 23 universities this technique assigns  the whole of the 
inefficiency to bad governance. Our results clearly indicate that a great deal of inefficiency 
in Spanish HEIs’ is attributable to deficient governance, and highlight the scope for 
improvement in performance through better governance mechanisms. 
 
In the knowledge society, universities are expected not only to teach and research, but also 
to actively contribute to social and economic development in a context of increased 
institutional global competition. This scenario differs significantly from the one that shaped 
administrative structures in the Spanish higher education sector in the past. Therefore, 
governance reform in Spanish HEIs is urgently needed. Several goals should be kept in 
mind in designing a new governance structure. First, the key role of universities in the 
creation and development of relevant social and economic values should be preserved. 
Second, universities should be able to compete effectively in the globalized higher 
education markets. Third, quality education must be provided and adapted to social needs 
and labor market demands. These main goals call for the following short-term objectives on 
the part of Spanish HEIs: i) an increase in the flexibility of decision-making mechanisms; 
ii) an increase in, and reinforcement of, the links between universities and society; iii)  the 
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design and execution of individualized institutional strategic planning; iv) an increase in 
transparency and accountability. These objectives coincide with the trends observed 
recently in European higher education system reforms. 
 
Further research should try to overcome some of the limitations of this study. For instance, 
a key issue is the analysis of the link between governance and efficiency with direct 
measures of governance quality. Further, another major limitation is related to the evolution 
of the effects of governance on efficiency. The question of whether this has changed or not 
during the recent years as a consequence of current reforms in the Spanish higher education 
sector remains unanswered in our analysis, but certainly constitutes a research question to 
be addressed in the future. Even though we have adopted a novel approach to the definition 
of inputs and outputs, more research is needed in order to see whether the results obtained 
in this study are sensitive to the definition of inputs and outputs and whether the PEI 
approach is effective for the introduction of consideration of quality in efficiency analysis. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Efficiency scores of Spanish public universities  
Univ. Index CR Index VR CR/VR Univ. Index CR Index VR CR/VR 
UDC 1.000 1.000 1.000 ULPGC 1.000 1.000 1.000 
UAH 0.723 0.753 0.961 ULEON 0.935 0.936 1.000 
UA 0.750 0.755 0.993 UdL 0.846 0.984 0.859 
UAL 0.696 0.722 0.965 UMA 1.000 1.000 1.000 
UAB 0.933 0.989 0.944 UMH 0.981 0.999 0.982 
UAM 0.971 1.000 0.971 UM 0.768 0.777 0.989 
UB 1.000 1.000 1.000 UNIOVI 0.934 0.976 0.956 
UBU 0.861 0.898 0.959 UPO 0.929 1.000 0.929 
UCA 0.876 0.880 0.995 UPV-EHU 1.000 1.000 1.000 
UCAN 0.992 1.000 0.992 UPCT 0.742 0.771 0.962 
UC3M 0.701 0.738 0.949 UPC 1.000 1.000 1.000 
UCLM 0.894 0.946 0.945 UPM 1.000 1.000 1.000 
UCM 1.000 1.000 1.000 UPV 1.000 1.000 1.000 
UCO 0.902 0.915 0.986 UPF 0.818 0.968 0.845 
UEX 1.000 1.000 1.000 UNAVARRA 0.914 1.000 0.914 
UdG 0.785 0.876 0.897 URJC 1.000 1.000 1.000 
UGR 1.000 1.000 1.000 URV 1.000 1.000 1.000 
UHU 0.774 0.802 0.964 USAL 0.910 0.927 0.981 
UIB 0.546 0.559 0.976 USC 1.000 1.000 1.000 
UJAEN 0.894 1.000 0.894 US 0.776 0.796 0.975 
UJI 0.456 0.462 0.985 UV 1.000 1.000 1.000 
ULL 0.761 0.775 0.982 UVA 1.000 1.000 1.000 
UR 1.000 1.000 1.000 UZ 0.961 1.000 0.961 
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Table A2: Inefficient universities and information of their peers and weights 
Univ. Index (VR) 
Peers 
(Weight over the inefficient university) 
24: UMH 0.999 UPC (16%) 
URV 
(23.7%)
UCAN 
(2.5%) 
URJC 
(57.9%) 
   
25: UAB 0.989 UPV (23.8%) 
UV 
(14.4%)
UZ 
(15.3%) 
UB 
(46.5%) 
   
26: UdL 0.984 UZ (44.1%) 
URJC 
(10.7%)
UNAVARR 
(21.6%) 
UR 
(23.6%) 
   
27: UNIOVI 0.976 UGR (33.2%) 
UPO 
(7.8%) 
UJAEN 
(2.3%) 
UR 
(10.3%) 
EHU 
(31.5%) 
UDC 
(14.8%) 
 
28: UPF 0.968 UPV (13%) 
UV 
(2.8%) 
URJC 
(25.7%) 
UNAVAR 
(54.6%) 
UR 
(3.8%) 
  
29: UCLM 0.946 UGR (31.7%) 
UPO 
(20%) 
UR 
(14%) 
URJC 
(0.4%) 
UDC 
(34%) 
  
30: ULEON 0.936 UMA (7%) 
UR 
(45.8%)
UDC 
(47.3%) 
    
31: USAL 0.927 UV (22.7%) 
EHU 
(17.7%)
UZ 
(2.2%) 
URJC 
(3.2%) 
UNAVAR 
(11.1%) 
UR 
(43%) 
 
32: UCO 0.915 USC (15.4%) 
URJC 
(1.8%) 
UZ 
(1.8%) 
UV 
(55.9%) 
UR 
(7.3%) 
URV 
(17.8%) 
 
33: UBU 0.898 UV (8%) 
URJC 
(10.7%)
UR 
(67.7%) 
UDC 
(13.6%) 
 
 
  
34: UCA 0.880 UJAEN (4.3%) 
UVA 
(59.3%)
EHU 
(7.3%) 
UR 
(28.7%) 
URJC 
(0.4%) 
  
35: UdG 0.876 UZ (41.3%) 
UV 
(4.7%) 
UR 
(43.6%) 
URJC 
(7.5%) 
UNAVAR 
(2.9%) 
  
36: UHU 0.802 UV (33%) 
URJC 
(10.5%)
UR 
(48.8%) 
UDC 
(7.7%) 
   
37: US 0.796 UV (7.6%) 
UGR 
(76.9%)
UCM 
(15.6%) 
    
38: UM 0.777 UVA (7.2%) 
UDC 
(30.1%)
UGR 
(34.8%) 
UV 
(21.5%) 
URJC 
(6.3%) 
  
39: ULL 0.775 UGR (18%) 
UR 
(1.6%) 
UEX 
(27.6%) 
EHU 
(11.1%) 
UVA 
(41.8%) 
  
40: UPCT 0.771 UPC (4%) 
UPM 
(34.6%)
UPV 
(40.1%) 
URJC 
(21.2%) 
   
41: UA 0.755 UV (32.1%) 
UR 
(5.5%) 
UDC 
(57%) 
URJC 
(5.5%) 
   
42: UAH 0.753 URJC (2.2%) 
USC 
(3.2%) 
EHU 
(3.2%) 
UV 
(28.3%) 
UNAVAR 
(27.2%) 
UZ 
(6.9%) 
UR 
(29%)
43: UC3M 0.738 UNAVAR (15.6%) 
EHU 
(37.6%)
UZ 
(3.7%) 
URJC 
(43.1%) 
   
44: UAL 0.722 UV (38.1%) 
UR 
(26.2%)
UDC 
(35.7%) 
    
45: UIB 0.559 UV (5.4%) 
URJC 
(18.9%)
UR 
(38.1%) 
EHU 
(28.1%) 
UZ 
(9.5%) 
  
46: UJI 0.462 USC (3.1%) 
UDC 
(17.3%)
UV 
(68.7%) 
URJC 
(10.9%) 
   
Source: Our own data. 
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Table A3. Spanish public universities 
UDC: Universidad de A Coruña ULEON: Universidad de León  
UAH: Universidad de Alcalá de Henares UdL: Universitat de Lleida 
UA: Universitat d’Alacant UMA: Universidad de Málaga 
UAL: Universidad de Almeria UMH: Universitat Miguel Hernández d’Elx 
UAB: Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona UM: Universidad de Murcia 
UAM: Universidad Autónoma de Madrid UNIOVI: Universidad de Oviedo 
UB: Universitat de Barcelona UPO: Universidad Pablo de Olavide 
UBU: Universidad de Burgos UPV-EHU: Universidad del País Vasco. Euskal 
Herriko Unibertsitatea 
UCA: Universidad de Cádiz UPCT: Universidad Politécnica de Cartagena  
UCAN: Universidad de Cantabria UPC: Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya 
UC3M: Universidad Carlos III de Madrid UPM: Universidad Politécnica de Madrid 
UCLM: Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha UPV: Universitat Politècnica de Valencia 
UCM: Universidad Complutense de Madrid UPF: Universitat Pompeu Fabra 
UCO: Universidad de Córdoba  UNAVARRA: Universidad Pública de Navarra 
UEX: Universidad de Extremadura URJC: Universidad Rey Juan Carlos 
UdG: Universitat de Girona URV: Universitat Rovira i Virgili 
UGR: Universidad de Granada USAL: Universidad de Salamanca 
UHU: Universidad de Huelva USC: Universidad de Santiago de Compostela 
UIB: Universitat de les Illes Balears US: Universidad de Sevilla 
UJAEN: Universidad de Jaén UV: Universitat de València Estudi General 
UJI: Universitat Jaume I de Castelló UVA: Universidad de Valladolid 
ULL: Universidad de La Laguna UVIGO: Universidad de Vigo 
UR: Universidad de La Rioja UZ: Universidad de Zaragoza 
ULPGC: Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran 
Canaria 
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